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1. SUMMARY: e question is whether inadvertant attorney 
error falling short of unconstitutionally ineffective assistance 
r---
can itself satisfy the "~;::- p ; 3 of Wainwright v. Sykes. 
2. FACTS AND Resp was charged with rape 
and abduction. Prior to trial, his counsel sought discovery of 
any statements the victim may have made. After an in camera 
inspection, the TC found that they were not exculpatory and did 
Cfk . -y11JA~ w a c1ut- It~ ~ 
CA4/J~ rgc~ t(/1//~.~ · 
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not have to be turned over. A renewed defense reque~t was also 
' ~ 
I ~ l denied. Resp was convicted. 
In his notice of appeal to the va. s. Ct., resp's counsel 
included among the assigned errors a claim that the TC should 
have allowed him access to the victim's statements. In his 
actual brief, however, he did not pursue this issue. The s. Ct. 
denied review. Resp then pursued state habeas remedies, arguing 
that withholding the victim's statements denied him due process. 
The TC dismissed because the claim had not been raised on direct 
appeal, and the va. s. ct. again denied review. 
Resp then filed this federal habeas action. His underlying 
claim is that the TC should have ordered the prosecution to 
disclose the victim's statements, even if they were not 
exculpatory, as long as they were "material to guilt." Compare 
United States v. Agurs, 427 u.s. 97, 106 (1976), with Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 u.s. 83 (1963). The DC (Clarke, ED Va) denied 
both the writ and a certificate of probable cause because resp 
had failed to raise the claim in state court. It refused to 
entertain resp's claim that the default was the result of 
ineffective assistance, stating that that issue must also be 
raised first in the state courts. 
CA4 (Ervin, Wyzanski (dj): Hall, diss) reversed. It set out 
the question as: "Can a single act or omission by counsel, 
insufficient by itself to contravene the 6th Am, satisfy ·the 
'cause' prong" of Wainwright v. Sykes. The answer was that it 
could, as long as it was not the result of deliberate strategy. 




'-- oe cause only if it amounted to constitutionally ineffective 
assistance of counsel. But if it was just the result ;~f 
I 
ignorance or oversight, the defendant should not be penalized for 
counsel's momentary lapse, and the default would be excused. 
Furthermore, since a claim of attorney error as cause is not 
itself a ground for habeas relief, it need not be exhausted in 
the state court (though a claim of ineffective assistance must 
be) • The CA remanded for a determination whether there was a 
strategic explanation for counsel's error, and whether the 
prejudice prong was satisfied. 
In dissent, Judge Hall first argued that resp's request for 
materials at trial was based on Jencks, not Brady, and therefore 
his claim was waived entirely apart from his failure to pursue it 
on appeal. Second, he found no indication of prejudice resulting 
from the procedural bar. Third, he criticised resp's failure to 
offer any evidence to dispute the great likelihood that the 
failure to pursue the issue on appeal was tactical. The 
majority's exception to Wainwright will ultimately swallow the 
rule. Finally, even if the failure to brief the issue on appeal 
did constitute both cause and prejudice, it should still have 
been presented to the state courts to rule on in the first 
instance. 
Upon rehearing en bane, the CA agreed with the panel, 5-4, 
relying on the opinions already written. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr -- If counsel's performance satisfies 
constitutional minima, procedural bars should be allowed to 
operate as expected. The decision below renders Wainwright 
-4-
- virtually meaningless. Other CAs have rejected an "Vnadvertance" 
excuse and held that errors falling short of ineffec~lve 
I 
assistance cannot constitute "cause." Long v. McKeen, 722 F.2d 
286 (CA6 1983), cert. denied, No. 83-6135 (1984): Tsirizotakis 
v. LaFevre, 736 F.2d 57 (CA2), cert. denied, No. 84-5305 (1984). 
In any event, the cause and prejudice issue must be 
exhausted in the state courts. See Alcorn v. Smith, cert. 
granted, No. 84-5636. 
Amicus (AGs of 39 States) -- The CA's decision is a return 
to pre-Wainwright days and is contrary to Engle v. Isaac, in 
which this Court noted that an apparently valid claim could be 
forfeited if "counsel might have overlooked it." 459 u.s., at 
133-134. 
4. DISCUSSION: The question whether attorney 
incompetence falling short of constitutionally inadequate 
assistance can constitute cause has divided the lower courts.As 
long as there is to be an exhaustion requirement, this is a 
dubious exception. It pokes a big hole in Wainwright. In 
addition, the CA's compromise distinction between deliberate and 
inadvertent errors is suspect, for there is no more reason that 
the defendant should pay the price for the first than the second. 
hA J- · t f · · t · 11 1 t k th t h · From 1s po1n o v1ew, 1 1s sma so ace o now a 1s 
lawyer's choice was tactical rather than inadvertent. 
The petn should at least be held for Alcorn v. Smith, No. 
-
84-5636, which directly raises the second question, viz., w~her 
the cause question itself must be exhausted, and implicitly 





no need to worry about exhaustion. A similar petn h~s been held 
' ~ 
for Alcorn. Lockett v. Arn, No. 84-5878. Depending "(j>n the 
I 
outcome and rationale in Alcorn, the Court may wish to grant this 
petn or Lockett. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: CFR, with a view toward a hold for No. 
84-5636. _______.. 
There is nor response. 
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MEMO TO ANNE: 
The question in this case is: 
"Whether attorney error, based on 
inadvertence that does not 
ineffective assistance of counsel, 
constitutes 'cause' under the 







Respondent was convicted in Virginia state court 
of rape and abduction. His attorney sought to obtain 
copies of all statements the victim may have made to the 
police relevant to the case. The state trial court 
reviewed the statements in camera, and concluded that they 
contained "no evidence of an exculpatory nature". When a 
second request was made by defendant immediately before 
trial, the trial court again inspected the statements and 
declined to release them as they contained nothing 
exculpatory. Respondent was relying on Brady and Jencks 
v. u.s. that require)' the prosecution to make available to 
a defendant any evidence in its possession that no fo nly is 
"material" but also is "favorable to the accused". 
Following his conviction, respondent appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Virginia and included in his notice 
of appeal - as one of seven errors assigned - that the 
trial judge had erred by not permitting defense counsel to 
examine any statements given the police by one defendant. 
Counsel, however, did not include this claim in the brief 
~ 
he filed with th€ Virginia Supreme Court. 
......... ~---,......,.,_~,....-, ........... 
Under the Rules 
ll .. ~"'~~ of that court, o~ "errors assigned in the petition for 
r~ appeal (that is in brief form) will be noticed by this 
r-~~J court ~ no error not so as~ig~be admitted , as a 
ground for reversal of a decision below." Accordingly, in 
t f1 "' 
~· 
~ . " . 
view of this procedural default, the Virginia Supreme 
Court denied certiorari. 
Respondent thereafter unsuccessfully sought state 
habeas corpus relief relying on his Brady claim, and then 
filed this habeas corpus petition in the u.s. District 
Court. That court dismissed respondent's petition because 
of his procedural default in failing to preserve the issue 
on direct appeal (Judge Clarke). On appeal to CA4, a 
panel composed of Circuit Judges Hall and Ervin, and 
District Judge wyzanski reversed, with Judge Hall 
dissenting. The case then was considered~ bane, and the 
_________., 
decision and opinion of the panel were approved by a 5-4 
Jo 
vote. The four dissenting judges were: Hall, Widener, 
Russell and Chapman. 
lt was conceded by counsel for respondent in his 
---argument before CA4 that the negligent or inadvertent 
failure to have included the alleged error on the appeal 
to the Virginia Supreme Court did not constitute 
"ineffectiveness assistance of counsel". Indeed, CA4 
-----------------------------------~---,---~ 
acknowledged that a single error due to "inadvertence or 
ignorance" would . not be viewed as ineffective assistance 
of counsel, and it was noted that trial counsel in this 
case had performed well. Nevertheless, relying primarily 
on Jurek v. Estelle, 593 F.2d 672, 683 n. 19 (CAS), CA4 
concluded: 
"We conclude that attorney error short of 
wholesale ineffective assistance of counsel can 
constitute Wainwright cause provided that the 
act or omission resulting in procedural default 
emanated from ignorance or inadvertence, rather 
than ae~16er~gy. A A * ~rocedural 
default is excused not when counsel reasonably 
but incorrectly exercises her judgment, but 
when, through ignorance or oversight, she fails 
to exercise it at all, in dereliction of the 
duty to represent her client. This is what we 
mean by attorney error, and in such a case, the 
defendant should not be penalized under 
Wainwright for a momentary lapse by counsel." 
App. 12 
4. 
Respondent's brief prepared by lawyers at 
Georgetown University Law Center makes some rather 
interesting and novel arguments. It is first argued that 
there is no need to exhaust the "cause and prejudice" 
issue before a state court. But if there is such a 
requirement, respondent says it does not apply in this 
case. The Virginia Supreme Court Rules provide no remedy 
for a procedural default that occurred on appeal as -
distinguished from one that occurred at trial. I note 
here that neither of these points was relied upon by CA4 
in its decision, and I know of no authority that supports 
them. 
Respondent does emphasize that the reasoning of 
Sykes, and the "values" it serves, relates solely to trial 
defaults. Sykes did not consider defaults that occurred 
on appeal, and this question - according to respondent was 
left open in Jones v. Barnes, 463 u.s. 745. (I have not 
checked that decision). 
Respondent distinguishes Engle by arguing that it 
decided nothing beyond what Sykes decided. As to 
"exhaustion", respondent argues that in fact he fulfilled 
the exhaustion requirement of §2254(b)-(c) because his 
constitutional claim was presented in the state habeas 
corpus proceeding. 
Although I give counsel for respondent high marks 
for rather ingenious but subtle arguments, I am inclined 
to think that Engle comes close to controlling this case. 
Nor do I see a sound reason for making a distinction 
between a procedural default that occurred on appeal 
rather than at trial. I therefore am inclined to reverse. 
Unless you have a different view, Anne, a very 
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1b: Mr. Justice Powell January 21, 1986 
From: Anne 
No. 84-1554, Murray v. Carrier 
(cert. to CA4) (argument January 21, 1985) 
Questions Presented 
( 1) Is attorney error based on ignorance or 
inadvertence, which does not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, sufficient to 
establish the "cause" required to excuse a procedural default 
under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 u.s. 72 (1977)? 
(2) May the exhaustion requirement of 28 u.s.c. §2254 be 
circumvented merely because a claim of attorney error is asserted 
to establish "cause" under Wainwright v. Sykes rather than as an 
independent ground for habeas corpus relief? 
Background 
Resp was convicted of rape and abduction Virginia 
state court. Prior to trial, resp 's lawyer moved to discover 
statements made by the victim to the police. Following in camera 
inspection of the statements, the trial judge informed . counsel 
that the statements contained no exculpatory evidence and would 
not be released. Immediately before trial, defense counsel again 
moved to discover statements made by the victim and by an 
identification witness. The judge denied this motion as well, 
and counsel excepted on the record. 
Cbunsel filed a notice of appeal, which listed an 
argument concerning the judge's refusal to release the 
statements. But when counsel filed his appellate brief, he 
omitted that argument. After the conviction was affirmed on 
appeal, resp filed a state habeas petition alleging that the 
judge's refusal to release the statements denied him due process. 
The state court dismissed the petition on the ground that the 
claim was procedurally barred because resp had failed to raise 
the claim on direct appeal. 
Resp then filed a habeas petition in federal DC, renewing 
his argument that the trial judge's refusal to turn over the 
witnesses' statements denied him due process. The DC denied the 
writ, reasoning that resp's procedural default barred him from 
pressing the claim in federal court. The DC also noted that resp 
had not exhausted his ineffective assistance claim based on 
counsel's failure to press the due process argument on appeal. 
.Jo 
' A panel of CA4 reversed, holding that "attorney error 
' 
short of wholesale ineffectiveness of counsel ca~~ constitute 
wainwright cause, provided that the act or omission resulting in 
procedural default emanated from ignorance or inadvertence, 
rather than deliberate strategy." CA4 then remanded for the DC 
to determine if the failure to raise the due process claim on 
direct appeal was the result of attorney error or strategic 
choice and to determine if resp was prejudiced by the alleged 
error. Judge Hall dissented, in part because he disagreed with 
the panel's conclusion that attorney error that falls short of 
ineffective assistance can amount to "cause." Judge Hall pointed 
out that the panel's interpretation of cause would mean that 
every time a lawyer failed to abide by a state procedural rule, 
the defendant could avoid Wainwright by asserting that such 
failure was due to his lawyer's ignorance of procedure. In Judge 
Hall's view, such interpretation of "cause" would ultimately 
allow the exception to swallow the rule. 
On rehearing en bane, CA4 affirmed the panel decision for 
the reasons stated in that opinion. Four judges dissented, 
stating that they agreed with the views expressed in Judge Hall's 
opinion. 
Discussion 
CA4 clearly erred in deciding that "cause" can be found 
on attorney ignorance or inadvertence. In my view, ignorance or 
inadvertence can never constitute cause. This portion of CA4's 
decision is not difficult to dispose of for, in Engle v. Isaac, 
456 u.s. 107, the Court essentially recognized that errors caused 
by counsel's ignorance or inadvertence will not 










whether attorney error can ever amount to "cause" under 
wainwright v. Sykes. That is, the Court could hold that, though 
mere ignorant or inadvertent error does not amount to cause, 
serious attorney error (sufficient to establish the first prong 
of the Strickland v. Washington test for ineffective assistance 
or some intermediate standard) can constitute cause. 1 would 
argue that attorney error, no rna t ter how serious, should never 
constitute cause. I fear that this position may sound extreme, 
but I think that it is doctrinally the most sensible. My reasons 
for taking this view are the following. 
My reading of Engle v. Isaac and of Reed v. Ross, 104 
s.ct 2901 (cause for failure to raise claim may be found where 
claim was so "novel" that counsel reasonably failed to recognize 
and raise it), suggests that "cause" is some external factor that 
was beyond counsel's control at the time of trial, such as where 
the trial court prevented counsel from raising his objection, 
where it was impracticable for counsel to object, or where the 
state did not require an objection in a particular form. Simple 
attorney error obviously would not amount to "cause" under this 
standard. Moreover, serious attorney error would not satisfy 
this standard either because counsel's failure properly to 
perform his duties is not something beyond counsel's control. 
1 wish to emphasize that, by adopting such an approach, 
the Court would not be denying relief to prisoners who allege 
serious attorney error. Such a claim properly should be raised 
..Jo 
as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Th~t is, where 
. ~ 
the prisoner believes that his lawyer's procedural dl~ault was so 
egregious as to deny him a fair trial, the prisoner should allege 
an ineffective assistance claim, listing the procedural default 
as the example of attorney error. The prisoner would be required 
to present that claim to the state courts for exhaustion before 
raising it on federal habeas corpus. 
I think that this approach is most sensible and is 
consistent with the case law. It would create enormous confusion 
of attorney error, some constituting cause and others 
constituti~t4:_c~ ance. Nor does it make sense to 
allow a prisoner to raise ineffective assistance as "cause" and 
also as a Sixth Amendment violation. The Sixth Amendment 
guar'antees a prisoner a certain level of assistance. If the 
defendant believes that he has been denied such assistance, 
whether through procedural default or some other failure of 
counsel, then he should be required to raise the claim under the 
rubric of ineffective assistance. 
This memo states my views very briefly because at this 
late moment I still wished to give them to you prior to 
conference. Of course, I will be happy to do a follow-up memo 
with more extensive analysis and support. 
Argued 1/21/86 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1554 
EDWARD W. MURRAY, ACTING DIRECTOR, VIR-
GINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, PETI-
TIONER v. CLIFFORD W. CARRIER 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1986] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We granted certoriari in this case to consider whether a 
federal habeas petitioner can show cause for a procedural de-
fault by establishing that competent defense counsel inad-
vertently failed to raise the substantive claim of error rather 
than deliberately withholding it for tactical reasons. 
I 
Respondent Clifford Carrier was convicted of rape and ab-
duction by a Virginia jury in 1977. Before trial, respond-
ent's court-appointed counsel moved for discovery of the vic-
tim's statements to police describing "her assailants, the 
vehicle the assailants were driving, and the location of where 
the alleged rape took place." Record II, at 11. The presid-
ing judge denied the motion by letter to counsel after examin-
ing the statements in camera and determining that they con-
tained no exculpatory evidence. Record II, at 31. 
Respondent's counsel made a second motion to discover the 
victim's statements immediately prior to trial, which the trial 
judge denied for the same reason after conducting his own in 
camera examination. Tr. 151-152. 
After respondent was convicted, his counsel filed a notice 
of appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court assigning seven 
errors, of which the fifth was: 
2 
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"Did the trial judge err by not permitting defendant's 
counsel to examine the written statements of the victim 
prior to trial, and during the course of the trial?" 
Record II, at 83. 
Without consulting respondent, counsel subsequently sub-
mitted the requiredpetition for appeal but failed to include 
this claim, notwithstanding that Virginia Supreme Court 
Rule 5:21 provides that "[o]nly errors assigned in the petition 
for appeal will be noticed by this Court and no error not so 
assigned will be admitted as a ground for reversal of a deci-. 
sion below." The Virginia Supreme Court refused the ap-
peal and this Court denied certiorari. Carrier v. Virginia , 
439 u. s. 1076 (1979). 
A year later respondent, by this time proceeding pro se, 
filed a state habeas corpus petition claiming that he had been 
denied due process of law by the prosecution's withholding of 
the victim's statements. The State sought dismissal of his 
petition on the ground that respondent was barred from pre-
senting his due process discovery claim on collateral review 
because he failed to raise that claim on appeal. The state ha-
beas court dismissed the petition "for the reasons stated in 
the Motion to Dismiss," Record I, at Tab 12, and the Virginia 
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 
Respondent next filed a pro se habeas petition in the Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, renewing his 
due process discovery claim as grounds for relief. The State 
filed a motion to dismiss asserting that respondent's failure to 
raise the issue on direct appeal was a procedural default bar-
ring federal habeas review under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 
U. S. 72 (1977), and that respondent had not exhausted his 
state remedies because he could bring an ineffective assist-
ance of counsel claim in the state courts to establish that his 
procedural default should be excused. Record I, at tab 3. 
The United States magistrate to whom the case was referred 
recommended dismissal by virtue of the procedural default 
and also ruled that respondent had not exhausted his state 
84-1554-0PINION 




remedies. In reply to the magistrate's report, respondent 
alleged that his procedural default was "due to ineffective as-
sistance of counsel during the filing of his appeal." App. 11. 
The District Court approved the magistrate's report, holding 
the discovery claim barred by the procedural default and in-
dicating that respondent should establish cause for that de-
fault in the state courts. 
At oral argument on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, respondent abandoned any claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel but asserted that counsel had mis-
takenly omitted his discovery claim from the petition for ap-
peal and that this error was cause for his default. A divided 
panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. Car-
rier v. Hutto, 724 F. 2d 396 (CA4 1983). The court con-
strued respondent's objection to the denial of discovery as 
having rested throughout on a contention that Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), requires the prosecution to 
disclose any evidence that might be material to guilt whether 
or not it is exculpatory, and concluded that when respond-
ent's counsel omitted this discovery claim from the petition 
for review "the issue was lost for purposes of direct and col-
lateral review." Carrier v. Hutto, supra, at 399. The court 
framed the issue before it as whether "a single act or omis-
sion by counsel, insufficient by itself to contravene the sixth 
amendment, [can] satisfy the 'cause' prong of the exception to 
preclus~ve procedural default discussed in Wainwright?" 
I d., at 400. In answering this question, the court drew a dis-
positive distinction between procedural defaults resulting 
from deliberate tactical decisions and those resulting from ig-
norance or inadvertence. Id., at 401. The court deter-
mined that only in the latter category does an attorney's 
error constitute cause because, whereas a tactical decision 
implies that counsel has, at worst, "reasonably but incor-
rectly exercise[d] her judgment," ignorance or oversight im-
plies that counsel "fail[ed] to exercise it at all, in dereliction of 
the duty to represent her client." Ibid. Thus, in order to 
., 
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establish cause a federal habeas petitioner need only satisfy 
the district court "that the failure to object or to appeal his 
claim was the product of his attorney's ignorance or over-
sight, not a deliberate tactic." Ibid. Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeals remanded to the District Court: 
"[A]lthough the likelihood of attorney error appears very 
great in this case, we lack testimony from Carrier's 
counsel which might disclose a strategic reason for fail-
ing to appeal the Brady issue. The question of counsel's 
motivation is one of fact for the district court to resolve 
upon taking further evidence." I d. , at 402. 
The court also ruled that the District Court erred in sug-
gesting that respondent should establish cause for the default 
in the state courts. "The exhaustion requirement of 28 
U. S. C. § 2254 pertains to independent claims for habeas re-
lief, not to the proffer of Wainwright cause and prejudice." 
Ibid. Since respondent did not allege ineffective assistance 
of counsel as an independent basis for habeas relief, the case 
presented no exhaustion question. 
The dissenting judge believed that the petition should have 
been dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies because 
respondent had never presented his discovery claim as a de-
nial of due process in the state courts, id., at 403-404 (Hall, 
J ., dissenting), and differed with the majority's interpreta-
tion of the cause standard because "[it] will ultimately allow 
the exception to swallow the rule." Id., at 405. The State 
sought rehearing, and the en bane Court of Appeals adopted 
the panel majority's decision, with four judges dissenting. 
Carrier v. Hutto, 754 F. 2d 521 (CA4 1985). We now 
reverse. 
II 
Wainwright v. Sykes held that a federal habeas petitioner 
who has failed to comply with a State's contemporaneous-ob-
jection rule at trial must show cause for the procedural de-
fault and prejudice attributable thereto in order to obtain re-
.. 
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view of his defaulted constitutional claim. 433 U. S., at 87. 
See also Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 536 (1976). In so 
holding, the Court explicitly rejected the standard described 
in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963), under which a federal 
habeas court could refuse to review a defaulted claim only if 
"an applicant ha[d] deliberately bypassed the orderly proce-
dure of the state courts," id., at 438, by personal waiver of 
the claim amounting to "'an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege."' Id., at 439 
(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938)). See 
Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 87-88. At a minimum, then, 
Wainwright v. Sykes plainly implied that default of a con-
stitutional claim by counsel pursuant to a trial strategy or 
tactical decision would, absent extraordinary circumstances, 
bind the habeas petitioner even if he had not personally 
waived that claim. See id., at 91, n. 14; Reed v. Ross,--
U. S. --, -- (1984). Beyond that, the Court left open 
"for resolution in future decisions the precise definition of the 
'cause'-and-'prejudice' standard." Id., at 87. 
We revisited the cause and prejudice test in Engle v. 
Isaac, 456 U. S. 107 (1982). Like Wainwright v. Sykes, 
Engle involved claims that were procedurally defaulted at 
trial. In seeking to establish cause for their defaults, the 
prisoners argued that "they could not have known at the time 
of their trials" of the substantive basis for their constitutional 
claims, which were premised on In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 
(1970). Engle, supra, at 130. Without deciding "whether 
the novelty of a constitutional claim ever establishes cause 
for a failure to object," id., at 131, we rejected this contention 
because we could not conclude that the legal basis for framing 
the prisoners' constitutional claims was unavailable at the 
time. I d., at 133. In language that bears directly on the 
present case, we said: 
"We do not suggest that every astute counsel would 
have relied upon Winship to assert the unconstitutional-
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den of proving an affirmative defense. Every trial 
presents a myriad of possible claims. Counsel might 
have overlooked or chosen to omit respondents' due 
process argument while pursuing other avenues of de-
fense. We have long recognized, however, that the 
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants only a fair 
trial and a competent attorney. It does not insure that 
defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceiv-
able constitutional claim. Where the basis for a con-
stitutional claim is available, and other defense counsel 
have perceived and litigated that claim, the demands of 
comity and finality counsel against labeling alleged un-
awareness of the objection as a cause for a procedural de-
fault." Id., at 133-134 (footnote omitted). 
The thrust of this part of our decision in Engle is unmistak-
able: the mere fact that counsel failed to recognize the factual 
or legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise the claim despite 
recognizing it, does not constitute cause for a procedural de-
fault. At least with respect to defaults that occur at trial, 
the Court of Appeals' holding that ignorant or inadvertent at-
torney error is cause for any resulting procedural default is 
plainly inconsistent with Engle. It is no less inconsistent 
with the purposes served by the cause and prejudice stand-
ard. That standard rests not only on the need to deter inten-
tional defaults but on a judgment that the costs of federal ha-
beas review "are particularly high when a trial default has 
barred a prisoner from obtaining adjudication of his constitu-
tional claim in the state courts." Engle, supra, at 128. 
Those costs, which include a reduction in the finality of litiga-
tion and the frustration of "both the States' sovereign power 
to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor 
constitutional rights," ibid., are heightened in several re-
spects when a trial default occurs: the default deprives the 
trial court of an opportunity to correct any error without re-
trial, detracts from the importance or the trial itself, gives 
state appellate courts no chance to review trial errors, and 
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"exacts an extra charge by undercutting the State's ability to 
enforce its procedural rules." Id., at 129. Clearly, these 
considerable costs do not disappear when the default stems 
from counsel's ignorance or inadvertence rather than from a 
deliberate decision, for whatever reason, to withhold a claim. 
Indeed, the rule applied by the Court of Appeals would sig-
nificantly increase the costs associated with a procedural de-
fault in many cases. In order to determine whether there 
was cause for a procedural default, federal habeas courts 
would routinely be required to hold evidentiary hearings to 
determine what prompted counsel's failure to raise the claim 
in question. While the federal habeas courts would no doubt 
strive to minimize the burdens to all concerned through the 
use of affidavits or other simplifying procedures, we are not 
prepared to assume that these costs would be negligible, par-
ticularly since, as we observed in Strickland v. Washington, 
-- U. S. --, -- (1984), "[i]ntensive scrutiny of counsel 
... could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of 
defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, 
and undermine the trust between attorney and client." Nor 
will it always be easy to classify counsel's behavior in accord-
ance with the deceptively simple categories propounded by 
the Court of Appeals. Does counsel act out of "ignorance," 
for example, by failing to raise a claim for tactical reasons 
after mistakenly assessing its strength on the basis of an in-
complete acquaintance with the relevant precedent? The 
uncertain dimensions of any exception for "inadvertence" or 
"ignorance" furnish an additional reason for rejecting it. 
We think, then, that the question of cause for a procedural 
default does not turn on whether counsel erred or on the kind 
of error counsel may have made. So long as a defendant is 
represented by counsel whose performance is not constitu-
tionally ineffective under the standard established in 
Strickland v. Washington,-- U.S.--, (1984), we dis-
cern no inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of attorney 
error that results in a procedural default. Instea , we think 
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that the existence of ca se for a procedural default must ordi-
narily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some ob-
jective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's ef-
forts to comply with the State's procedural rule. Without 
attempting an exhaustive catalog of such objective impedi-
ments to compliance with a procedural rule, we note that a 
showing~ factu@l.Qr eg.@-1 basis for a claim was not rea-
sonably available to counsel, see Reed v. Ross, supra, at 
--, or that "some interference by officials," Brown v. 
Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 486 (1953), made compliance impracti-
cable, would constitute cause under this standard. 
Similarly, if the procedural default is the result of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself re-
quires that responsibility for the default be imputed to the 
State, which may not "conduct[] trials at which persons who 
face incarceration must defend themselves without adequate 
legal assistance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 344 
(1980). Ineffective assistance of counsel, then, is cause for a 
procedural default. However, we think that the exhaustion 
doctrine, which is "principally designed to protect the state 
courts' role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent dis-
ruption of state judicial proceedings," Rose v. Lundy, 455 
U. S. 509, 518 (1982), generally requires that a claim of inef-
fective assistance be presented to the state courts as an inde-
pendent claim before it may be used to establish cause for a 
procedural default. The question whether there is cause for 
a procedural default does not pose any occasion for applying 
the exhaustion doctrine when the federal habeas court can 
adjudicate the question of cause-a question of federal law-
without deciding an independent and unexhausted constitu-
tional claim on the merits. But if a petitioner could raise his 
ineffective assistance claim for the first time on federal ha-
beas in order to show cause for a procedural default, the fed-
eral habeas court would find itself in the anomalous position 
of adjudicating an unexhausted constitutional claim for which 
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comity that underlies the exhaustion doctrine would be ill-
served by a rule that allowed a federal district court "to upset 
a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state 
courts to correct a constitutional violation," Darr v. Burford, 
339 U. S. 200, 204 (1950), and that holds true whether an in-
effective assistance claim is asserted as cause for a proce-
dural default or denominated as an independent ground for 
habeas relief. 
It is clear that respondent failed to show or even allege 
cause for his procedural default under this standard for 
cause, which Engle squarely supports. Respondent argues 
nevertheless that his case is not controlled by Engle because 
it involves a procedural default on appeal rather than at trial. 
Respondent does not dispute, however, that the cause and 
prejudice test applies to procedural defaults on appeal, as we 
plainly indicated in Reed v. Ross, supra, at --. Reed, 
which involved a claim that was defaulted on appeal, held 
that a habeas petitioner could establish cause for a procedural 
default if his claim is "so novel that its legal basis is not rea-
sonably available to counsel," id., at --. That holding 
would have been entirely unnecessary to the disposition of 
the prisoner's claim if the cause and prejudice test were inap-
plicable to procedural defaults on appeal. 
The distinction respondent would have us draw must 
therefore be made, if at all, in terms of the content of the 
cause requirement as applied to procedural defaults on ap-
peal. Accordingly, respondent asks us to affirm the Court of 
Appeals' judgment on the narrow ground that even if coun-
sel's ignorance or inadvertence does not constitute cause for a 
procedural default at trial, it does constitute cause for a pro-
cedural default on appeal. In support of this distinction, re-
spondent asserts that the concerns that underlie the cause 
and prejudice test are not present in the case of defaults on 
appeal. A default on appeal, he maintains, does not detract 
from the significance of the trial or from the development of a 
full trial record, or deprive the trial court of an opportunity to 
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correct error without the need for retrial. Moreover, unlike 
the rapid pace of trial, in which it is a matter of necessity that 
counsel's decisions bind the defendant, "the appellate process 
affords the attorney time for reflection, research, and full 
consultation with his client." Brief for Respondent 19. Fi-
nally, respondent suggests that there is no likelihood that an 
attorney will preserve an objection at trial yet choose to 
withhold it on appeal in order to "sandbag" the prosecution 
by raising the claim on federal habeas if relief is denied by the 
state courts. 
These arguments are unpersuasive. A State's procedural 
rules serve vital purposes at trial, on appeal, and on state col-
lateral attack. The important role of appellate procedural 
rules is aptly captured by the Court's description in Reed v. 
Ross of the purposes served by the procedural rule at issue 
there, which required the defendant initially to raise his legal 
claims on appeal rather than on postconviction review: 
"It affords the state courts the opportunity to resolve 
the issue shortly after trial, while evidence is still avail-
able both to assess the defendant's claim and to retry the 
defendant effectively if he prevails in his appeal. See 
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack 
on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 147 
(1970). This type of rule promotes not only the accuracy 
and efficiency of judicial decisions, but also the finality of 
those decisions, by forcing the litigant to litigate all of his 
claims together, as quickly after trial as the docket will 
allow, and while the attention of the appellate court is 
focused on his case." -- U. S., at--. 
These legitimate state interests, which are manifestly fur-
thered by the comparable procedural rule at issue in this 
case, warrant our adherence to the conclusion to which they 
led the Court in Reed v. Ross-that the cause and prejudice 
test applies to defaults on appeal as to those at trial. 
We likewise believe that the standard for cause should not 
vary depending on the timing of a procedural default or on 
~ : 
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the strength of an uncertain and difficult assessment of the 
relative magnitude of the benefits attributable to the state 
procedural rules that attach at each successive stage of the 
judicial process. "Each State's complement of procedural 
rules ... channel[s], to the extent possible, the resolution of 
various types of questions to the stage of the judicial process 
at which they can be resolved most fairly and efficiently." 
I d., at--. It is apparent that the frustration of the State's 
interests that occurs when an appellate procedural rule is 
broken is not significantly diminished when counsel's breach 
results from ignorance or inadvertence rather than a delib-
erate decision, tactical or not, to abstain from raising the 
claim. Failure to raise a claim on appeal reduces the finality 
of appellate proceedings, deprives the appellate court of an 
opportunity to review trial error, and "undercut[s] the 
State's ability to enforce its procedural rules." Engle, 456 
U. S., at 129. As with procedural defaults at trial, these 
costs are imposed on the State regardless of the kind of attor-
ney error that led to the procedural default. Nor do we 
agree that the possibility of "sandbagging" vanishes once a 
trial has ended in conviction, since appellate counsel might 
well conclude that the best strategy is to select a few promis-
ing claims for airing on appeal, while reserving others for fed-
eral habeas review should the appeal be unsuccessful. More-
over, we see little reason why counsel's failure to detect a 
colorable constitutional claim should be treated differently 
from a deliberate but equally prejudicial failure by counsel to 
raise such a claim. The fact that the latter error can be char-
acterized as a misjudgment, while the former is more easily 
described as an oversight, is much too tenuous a distinction 
to justify a regime of evidentiary hearings into counsel's state 
of mind in failing to raise a claim on appeal. 
The real thrust of respondent's arguments appears to be 
that on appeal it is inappropriate to hold defendants to the 
errors of their attorneys. Were we to accept that proposi-
tion, defaults on appeal would presumably be governed by a 
-
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rule equivalent to Fay v. Noia's "deliberate bypass" stand-
ard, under which only personal waiver by the defendant 
would require enforcement of a procedural default. We ex-
press no opinion as to whether counsel's decision not to take 
an appeal at all might require treatment under such a stand-
ard, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S., at 88, n. 12, but, for 
the reasons already given, we hold that counsel's failure to 
raise a particular claim or claims on appeal is to be scruti-
nized under the cause and prejudice standard when that fail-
ure is treated as a procedural default by the state courts. 
Attorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel does 
not constitute cause for a procedural default even when that 
default occurs on appeal rather than at trial. To the con-
trary, cause for a procedural default on appeal ordinarily re-
quires a showing of some external impediment preventing 
counsel from constructing or raising the claim. Respondent 
has never alleged any external impediment that might have 
prevented counsel from raising his discovery claim in his peti-
tion for review, and has disavowed any claim that counsel's 
performance on appeal was so deficient as to make out an in-
effective assistance claim. See generally Evitts v. Lucey, 
--U. S. -- (1985) (right to effective assistance of counsel 
applies on an appeal as of right). Respondent's petition for 
federal habeas review of his procedurally defaulted discovery 
claim must therefore be dismissed for fajlure to establish 
cause for the default. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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